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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition following an evidentiary 
hearing. Relief should be granted because Mr. Daniels received ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel when counsel failed to raise the denial of a suppression motion in his direct 
appeal. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of the Case 
Mr. Daniels was charged by information with felony DUI; possession of a controlled 
substance; driving without privileges; and providing false information to law enforcement 
following a traffic stop in 2008. R 29. He filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during 
the traffic stop. R 29-30. However, the motion was denied. R 30. Mr. Daniels filed a motion to 
reconsider. R 30-31. That motion was also denied. R 31. 
At trial Mr. Daniels was convicted of felony DUI, possession of an open container of 
alcohol, driving without privileges, and providing false information to law enforcement. The 
jury could not reach a verdict on possession of a controlled substance. R 31. 
The court sentenced Mr. Daniels to ten years with a minimum fixed term of three years 
on the DUI. R 31. 
Mr. Daniels filed a timely notice of appeal. R 31. In his notice of appeal, he specifically 
noted that an issue to be presented on appeal was whether the district court erred in denying the 
motion to suppress. R 37054, Vol. 8, p. 27.1 
1 This Court took judicial notice ofthe record of the underlying criminal case in its order 
entered August 19,2013. 
However, on appeal, appointed counsel raised only the issues that the district court 
imposed an excessive sentence and later erred in denying Mr. Daniels' Criminal Rule 35 motion 
for reduction of the sentence. R 28-39. The Court of Appeals denied appellate relief in an 
unpublished decision that was less than two pages long. R 44-45. 
Mr. Daniels filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. R 5-11. The court 
appointed counsel and an amended petition was filed. R 27,46-49. The amended petition 
alleged: 
R47. 
2. Petitioner contends that appellate counsel failed to adequately prosecute his 
appeal in as much as appellate counsel refused, despite Petitioner's specific 
requests, to argue that the trial court erred by denying Petitioner's motion to 
suppress, and violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and right to 
due process oflaw, and but for this deficiency Petitioner would have argued that 
the denial of the motion to suppress was error, and would have prevailed on 
appeal, resulting in the reversal of his conviction. 
In response to the state's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Daniels filed a 
memorandum which argued that, as appellate counsel had effectively abandoned the appeal, 
proof of prejudice was not required. R 60-64. The court denied the motion for summary 
dismissal as to the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (A claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel was dismissed pursuant to Mr. Daniels' concession that there was no 
basis for it.) R 65-72. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Daniels presented evidence and argument to support his 
claim that his constitutional right to counsel was violated when appellate counsel did not raise 
the suppression issue on direct appeal. Tr. 1/28/13. Mr. Daniels requested that the district court 
reinstate his right to appeal from all the convictions entered in the criminal case, most 
2 
specifically the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. R 78. 
The district court denied Mr. Daniels' petition holding that Mr. Daniels had failed to 
establish that appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and further that he failed to establish that the outcome of the appeal would have 
been different ifhe had been able to present the suppression issue. R 77-89. 
This appeal timely followed. R 88-91. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in denying post -conviction relief because the failure of appellate 
counsel to raise the suppression motion was constitutionally ineffective assistance? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Post-Conviction Relief 
Mr. Daniels presented evidence and argument in the district court in support of two 
alternate theories for relief: 1) that in failing to raise the suppression issue on appeal, appellate 
counsel denied Mr. Daniels his right to appeal and therefore was deficient and prejudice should 
be presumed; and 2) that in the alternative, the suppression issue was clearly stronger than the 
excessive sentence issue, establishing deficient performance, and that further, had counsel raised 
the suppression issue there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome, thus establishing 
prejudice. R 60-64; Tr. 1/28113, p. 29, In. 14 - p. 37, In. 6; p. 39, In. 21-22. The district court 
erred in failing to grant relief on either one of these theories. 
1. Appellate Counsel's Failure to Raise the Suppression Issue was Deficient and 
Presumptively Prejudicial 
An accused has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel, a right which includes the 
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right to effective assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 
796 (1963); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14,90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, n. 14 (1970). 
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the first appeal as a matter of right. Evitts 
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 384,396, 105 S.Ct. 830,836 (1985). 
In most cases, a petitioner asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate 
both that counsel rendered deficient performance and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to 
the petitioner. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). 
However, if appellate counsel's actions amounted to a denial of representation, the burden to 
show prejudice is inapplicable because prejudice is presumed. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
648, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984). For example, if counsel completely fails to file a notice of appeal, 
prejUdice is presumed without any need to show that the client would have prevailed on appeal. 
Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 111 S.Ct. 860 (1991). 
In Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of Appeals 
held that the Cronic presumption of prejudice should apply in three situations: (1) where the 
presence of counsel is denied altogether at a critical stage; (2) where counsel entirely fails to 
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, and (3) where counsel is called 
upon to render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could not (as 
where counsel is appointed the day before trial). 144 Idaho at 660, 168 P.3d at 44. The Court 
found none of these circumstances for Mintun because counsel was initially appointed to 
represent Mintun on appeal and before he withdrew he filed an adequate brief and the appellate 
court considered the issues raised, including claims of errors in evidentiary rulings at trial and a 
challenge to the denial of Mint un's Rule 35 motion. In finding the circumstances for application 
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of Cronic's presumption of prejudice not met for Mintun, the Court of Appeals carefully noted 
that "We do not preclude the possibility of a complete denial of appellate advocacy where a 
merits brief filed by an attorney is so wanting as to be the equivalent of no advocacy at all, see 
Jenkins v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158 (2nd Cir. 1987), but that did not occur. A competent brief was 
filed." 144 Idaho at 661, 168 P.3d at 45. 
In Jenkins, the case cited in Mintun, Jenkins' appellate counsel filed a five page brief 
raising only one issue - specifically that the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In the district court, Jenkins argued that he had received ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, but the district court found that Jenkins had suffered no prejudice because he 
had filed a 51 page pro se brief which put his potentially valid appellate issues before the 
appellate court. The Second Circuit found that Strickland did not apply and prejudice was 
presumed because "Jenkins had no counselor, at best, nominal counsel to represent his interests 
on the state appeal." 821 F.2d at 16l. 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held in Robinson v. Wyrick, 635 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1981), 
that when counsel files a brief which failed to properly preserve the issues presented for appeal, 
prejudice is presumed. Noting the deficiencies of the brief in the case before it, the Court wrote, 
"Under these narrow circumstances ... we have no difficulty in concluding that Robinson was 
denied his right to a direct appeal of his conviction and that he was denied his constitutional right 
to effective counsel just as much as if counsel had never filed a notice of appeal." 635 F.2d at 
758. 
In this case also, appellate counsel's failure to argue the suppression issue amounted to a 
complete denial of appellate advocacy so as to require the application of the Cronic presumption. 
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As is explained below, the sentencing issue in this case was so weak that it was either frivolous 
or barely distinguishable frivolous. To file a brief just raising that issue was the equivalent of 
filing no brief at all. 
While Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751, 103 S.Ct. 3308,3312 (1983), does state that 
an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed appellate counsel 
to press all non-frivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to pursue, that case involved an 
indigent appellant who was allowed to file his own pro se brief in addition to his appointed 
counsel's brief - by filing the pro se brief, the appellant had an opportunity to place his desired 
issues before the appellate court. It is that opportunity which is crucial to a constitutional 
analysis. 
As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Jones: 
Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806,95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975),] establishes that the 
right to counsel is more than a right to have one's case presented competently and 
effectively. It is predicated on the view that the function of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment is to protect the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial by 
assisting him in making choices that are his to make, not to make choices for him, 
although counsel may be better able to decide which tactics will be more effective 
for the defendant. Anders v. California[, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967),] 
also reflects that view. Even when appointed counsel believes an appeal has no 
merit, he must furnish his client a brief covering all arguable grounds for appeal 
so that the client may 'raise any points that he chooses.' 386 U.S., at 744,87 
S.Ct., at 1400. 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S., at 758, 108 S.Ct., at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
original). 
Idaho has no mechanism in the appellate rules which allow an appellant to file a pro se 
brief so long as he is represented by counsel. Therefore, the constitutional safety valve present in 
Jones is missing here. While in Jones, it was not necessary to declare a constitutional right to 
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force appointed counsel to raise any specific non-frivolous issue because the appellant could 
raise whatever issues he/she wished in a pro se brief, in Idaho, a constitutional right to force 
counsel to raise non-frivolous issues is necessary and will remain necessary so long as the 
appellate rules remain unchanged. Cf. Washington Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.10 
Statement of Additional Grounds for Review which specifically authorizes an appellant in a 
review of a criminal case to file a pro se statement of additional grounds for review to identify 
and discuss those matters which the appellant believe have not been adequately addressed by the 
brief filed by counsel. See also, Oregon Rule of Appellate Procedure 5.92 Supplemental pro se 
briefs. 
Thus, in this case, deficiency and presumptive prejudice exist because counsel failed to 
raise the non-frivolous issue requested by Mr. Daniels - whether the evidence obtained in 
violation of the constitution should have been suppressed - and Mr. Daniels had no other 
mechanism open to him to get the issue before the state appellate courts. Therefore, the district 
court should have granted post-conviction relief. 
2. Appellate Counsel's Failure to Raise the Suppression Issue was Deficient 
Performance that was Prejudicial 
In the alternative, the district court should have granted relief in post-conviction because 
the failure to raise the suppression motion on direct appeal was deficient performance that was 
prejudicial. Strickland, supra. 
When ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, the presumption of 
effective assistance of counsel is overcome. Mint un, 144 Idaho 661, 168 P .3d 45. In this case, 
the presumption is overcome. 
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In her testimony during the evidentiary hearing, appellate counsel stated that the 
suppression issue was not frivolous, but that it would not have been successful because of the 
Court of Appeals' holding in State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247, 233 P.3d 178 (Ct. App. 2010), 
which held that in accord with Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), a DUI 
arrest supplies a basis for a search ofa vehicle. 149 Idaho at 254, 233 P.3d at 186. Tr. 1128/13 p. 
23, In. 1-7. 
However, as acknowledged by appellate counsel, Cantrell is not consistent with the case 
law of some other states and the federal courts and is attackable. Tr. 1/28/13, p. 25, In. 12-17. 
Cases inconsistent with Cantrell include United States v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp.2d 724, 729 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2010); United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818,823-24 (D.C. App. 2012); United States v. 
Vinton, 594 F.3d 14,25 (D.C. Cir. 2010); People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2010). 
See also, State v. Snapp, 275 P.3d 289 (Wash. 2012), rejecting Gant on state constitutional 
grounds. 
In the suppression issue, appellate counsel had an issue that was by her own admission, 
arguable. Thus, if the issue was "stronger" than the excessive sentence issue, the failure to raise 
it was deficient performance. Mintun, supra. 
A look at the district court's comments at sentencing demonstrates that the excessive 
sentence issue was extremely weak: 
I don't doubt your sincerity at all in the statement you've given and the letter that 
you've submitted. But you understand, Mr. Daniels, that I do have to look at your 
past record here. I mean, that's going to be the one that is concrete that well could 
be an indication of how things might go in the future. 
The prior record, as has been stated, is - is atrocious. Like Mr. Rapp, I couldn't 
figure out exactly how many prior DUI's you had. I came up with 15, but perhaps 
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it is 16. The difference between 15 and 16 is really - it's not a great point. But 
the fact that you have that many DUI's is something that simply cannot be ignored 
when you're in here for sentencing on another DUI. 
The presentence report shows that you have had a tough life, as Mr. George 
stated, that you an alcoholic, and that has led to all of the several pages of prior 
violations of the laws. 
Mr. George rhetorically asked what's to be gained by sending you to prison. 
Well, the short answer is protection of society. That's one thing I have to look out 
for, and particularly in a DUI case is, does it look like someone is worthy of 
probation or even retained jurisdiction. Or are they going to be the kind of person 
who might get behind a wheel again in an intoxicated condition and [be] a danger 
to the public. Based upon your history, I think you are that person. You've done 
a retained; you've done prison; you've been on probation. And still end up doing 
this. The request for probation is not anything that I can seriously consider given 
the prior history here. 
The sentence I'm going to impose is a ten year sentence consisting of three years 
fixed and seven years indeterminate. And that will run consecutive to any prior 
case. The sentence on the misdemeanors here will be 180 days each, and you'll 
receive 180 days' credit for time served on each. 
Your driving privileges will be suspended absolutely for a period of three years 
following your release from prison. 
Trial Tr., p. 314, In. 18-p. 316, In. 8. 
No appellate court would ever seriously consider that this sentence imposed for a 16th or 
17th DUlwas excessive. See, Statev. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170, 175, 244 P.3d 1256, 1261 (Ct. 
App.2010). 
Even the weakest of suppression issues was stronger than the issue that Mr. Daniels 
received an excessive sentence. Thus, deficient performance was established. Mintun, supra. 
Likewise, prejudice was established. Had appellate counsel presented the suppression 
issue, it is reasonably probable that a different result would have been obtained. Specifically, 
Mr. Daniels could have made a convincing argument that arrest for a DUI standing alone is not 
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sufficient to support a warrantlesss search of a vehicle in the absence of any other basis to believe 
that evidence of the crime ofDUI will be found in the vehicle. See Reagan, supra; Taylor, 
supra; Vinton, supra; Chamberlain, supra. 
The district court erred in not granting relief under this alternate theory. 
v. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Daniels respectfully requests that the order denying 
post-conviction relief be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to grant a 
reinstatement of his right to appeal. 
Submitted this q!' day of October, 2013. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Cecil Da 
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